This is my response to the first chapter of the book, "An Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas". As usual, my response is an interpretation, elaboration, or addition to the book's content. The summary above has contained an interpretation of the book, but the response will involve my own thoughts as well. However, in this response I will comment as well on my current understanding of my own intellectual processes.
Before the actual response, I wish to write of my recent philosophical failures. In the past I was able to write many philosophical writings, long and I dare say with some wisdom, though not much. However, in the recent times of my life, I somehow lost that capacity. That loss is not due to my loss of intellectual capacity, but my attachment to God and the purity of God's Being.
First of all, we cannot understand God divorced from the natural or created order. For every single knowledge we have of Him is based on experience data of the created order. So my inner choices to abandon world totally led to this fall. As I become more and more concerned with pure being, I became less and less able to comprehend that pure being, which is God. It is thus a great lesson of detachment that God has taught me, but it was also about humility.
Scripture has clearly taught that faith in God comes from the visible things. In other words, God intends us to honor Him by honoring creation. For as Christ said, what we do for the least of us, we do for Him as well. However, my hatred of the world, as in genuine repulsion and rejection, has corrupted my faith. That is until God renewed it for me, and so I become enlightened of my corrupt old ways, and I chose to renew myself, a greater way of humility and detachment and of course, service of God.
The way God taught me these things is first by directing me to write about Scripture and the Catechism. These writings then I understand to be about studying, as humility grows. Then I obtained this book, which became a sign that God doesn't really want me to leave philosophy, but to restore it and write of it in the correct way, that is inspired by Him and by the created order, including words of the saints. It was my folly and pride to think that I can write with my own thoughts, without being inspired by God or others.
With that out of the way, let us begin with my proper response. There is a fascinating concept which I have never encountered before, that is habitus. The term is used a lot in this chapter, for that reason I shall explain what it is first. Habitus is a stable perfection relating to the free, spiritual soul and necessary in order to raise it to a higher level or to dispose it for and to facilitate operations chiefly of a rational free nature, or those under reason's control or command. This is a long sentence so let me unpack it.
First, it is a stable perfection, or goodness. Stability is how it is similar to habit, as in being a repetitiveness, both has stability. However, not all habits are good, while habitus is precisely a perfection, a goodness. Second, it is related to the free, spiritual soul. Free here I suspect to mean both in will and spiritually, that is free from the bondage of sin which can be habitual, thus the difference. Spiritual means the soul aimed at God, though it might simply refer to the fact that soul is spirit.
Third, it is necessary to raise it to a higher level, which considering Aquinas' philosophy, to a higher level of spirituality with God. Fourth, or to facilitate operations chiefly of a rational free nature or those under reason's control or command. This means it aids in operations of a rational nature, and again free of sin. By rational it does not simply mean to follow logical laws, but to be ordered towards happiness according to the real laws of happiness.
With that out of the way, we can continue. Now I shall not comment on the objections as greater knowledge is obtained from examining the answers. The first section of the first chapter concerns itself with the division of the speculative sciences into these divisions, natural science, mathematical science, and divine science. The objections by nature object to these divisions with various reasons that shall be answered later by Aquinas.
What is a speculative science? Speculative science is the science which has its end or purpose the knowledge of that science. This is opposed to operative sciences which are sciences directed not simply towards knowledge, but primarily to an action or operation. This division existed in the time of Aquinas, but I propose that with a wider understanding of the nature of science, the division might be blurred.
The blurring consists not in the contraction of operative sciences into speculative science but the expansion of speculative science into operative science. For all knowledge is directed to action. However, this may be debated with the idea that all action is directed to knowledge, in our Christian case, the knowledge of God. Let us compare this with the Christian and perhaps if God permits, a secular case.
The Christian faith teaches that salvation is by both faith and works. Faith is a speculative matter which leads to works, an operative matter. However, the primary object here is faith, the speculation, and the final goal of human life is the knowledge of God, again, a speculation (or theory in our terms). Of course not everyone is Christian so let us examine a more general case, with our good old friend the experience.
Knowledge is memory, and memory is recreational or recollective experience. Therefore, great knowledge is great experience. In a certain sense, everyone seeks the knowledge of experiences, and that is the aim of action. Action is all directed towards happiness, the experience of it, the knowledge of it, and thus the vision of happiness. For that reason, the end of man is theoretical or speculative, not practical. For it is only knowledge which ends and is eternal, action or events are fleeting and passing, they cannot be reliable sources of happiness.
The general answer, "On the contrary" to the objections is that both Aristotle and Ptolemy in their works have used the same division as Aquinas proposes though not in the same order. This order will be significant. Now, it is said that the object of science must be congruent with its end. For example, physics aims to know about physical motion, then its object is physical motion. In the case of speculative science in general, as the end is truth or knowledge, then the object must be the truth of a particular thing or a general thing.
Now, the habitus and powers are distinguished by their objects, but not by any kind of differences, instead only the essential differences. What does this mean? The opposite of essence is accident, it is highly related to the concept of necessity and contingency. Essential difference is a difference which divides the essence of objects as objects. Let us take the example Aquinas provides us, the difference between sound and color. Sound and color are as objects essentially different, they are different kinds of objects. Accidental difference is a difference which divides the accident of objects, this means it does not necessarily mean that the objects are different by their essence, but only in accident. The essence is commonly the true, pure, reduced, or simple form of the object. As a sensible object, an animal or a plant, the fact thereof is an accident. Because what the sense truly receives in essence is things such as color and sound, which has an essential difference. What this paragraph first states is that the habitus are divided by essential differences. Thus the speculative science must be divided likewise, for science is a habitus in of itself.
Then there is the requirement or criteria of what a speculable entity, meaning an object of speculation, must fulfill to be a speculable entity, basically its essence. Based on the intellective power, or just intellect, the object must be immaterial as the intellect is, and based on the habitus of science, the object must be necessary as science is about necessary things. The intellect is not a habitus, because the intellect is the thing perfected by the habitus, one of them is science. Then the description continues that the necessary thing is immobile, for a mobile thing is contingent as it can be or not be, while necessary things must be. Mobility here may refer to actual physical motion, or change in general. Therefore, separation from motion and matter is essential to the speculable entity.
There are things dependent on matter for existence and knowledge, such as man. Then there are things dependent on matter for existence but not for knowledge, such as lines and numbers. Finally there are things independent of matter totally, either because they are wholly immaterial or because they appear inconsistently in matter. The first category includes God and the angels, while the second includes substance, quality, being, potency, act, one and many, and things of this sort. The science which treats the independent from matter has 3 names, theology, metaphysics, and first philosophy. It is theology insofar its pre-eminent object is God. It is metaphysics insofar it is studied after physics. And it is first philosophy insofar all other sciences depend on this science for their principles.
It is noted that there is no category of objects which are dependent on matter for their knowledge but not for their being. What does it mean for something to depend on matter for our knowledge of them? It means that we need matter to know or have an idea about them. The idea itself contains matter. However, if this is true, then it means the object is necessarily made out of matter, as the idea of the object contains matter. For an object to be immaterial in being but depend on matter for knowledge is like a balloon containing water without the water ever being put inside the balloon in the first place. In other words, it is a contradiction, for that reason the threefold division is exhaustive.
I have rewritten the summary, or more precisely my understanding and some elaborations of the first section. However, I believe that I can do more by comparing these ideas with the modern world, or at least my understanding of the current age. Habitus is a new concept to me, but I believe it is comparable to virtue. However, simply knowing its nature is insufficient, one must also know the concrete or particular forms of the thing. Until then I cannot explain much about the habitus.
From my philosophical mind, the reasoning and explanations of Aquinas are beautiful, in the sense that they are organized, rigorous, and rational. All in all I don't see much faults with his reasoning. The threefold division of speculative sciences seems adequate even until now and the definitions hold up even today. However, of course natural science would have bloated, with mathematics expanding a great much but mostly staying the same, and metaphysics expanding a great deal as well. Most of what we call philosophy today is technically all metaphysics.
However, I am not so sure how some branches of philosophy may be called metaphysics. For example, social philosophy seems to be a blending of natural science and divine science? Though the category can be examined by examining the subject-matter. Society is foremost a material thing which depends on matter for both its understanding and its existence. So it should go under natural science. It cannot be divine science because society is neither divine nor angelic, and it is consistently material.
Though how are we discussing society? If we are discussing society proper as a group of humans, then yes it is a natural science. If we are discussing God's relationship to society, then it would be divine science insofar it involves God. Now metaphysics seems to be expandable to the whole science of the immaterial, that is the soul or spirit. For that reason theology currently studies much about man insofar it studies man's relation to God. So this science as theology would pretty much study everything insofar they are related to God or point us to God somehow.
Answer to the first objection. It is explained that Aristotle was using the term habitus to mean virtue, or intellectual virtues. There is the habitus of understanding which means self-evident principles, science which means demonstration through lower causes, and wisdom which means demonstration through highest causes. Aquinas then immediately cuts to the statement that sciences as habitus must be differentiated by their objects, so I assume because the habitus is meant as a virtue, then we ought to divide not by their nature as a virtue, but simply by the object they treat.
Logic is not a science but an instrument of science. For speculative science treat of those things the knowledge of which is sought for its own sake. Logic however is studied for the aid of other sciences. For this reason logic is not a principal part but reduced to speculative philosophy inasmuch as it provides speculation with its instruments.
The liberal arts are classed with speculative science because that's what students of philosophy are instructed with before actually studying philosophy, natural or rational. It is essentially the education of the method of science before the science itself. The term "arts" do not necessarily correlate with aesthetic work, but more of to a science which leads to any kind of making, rational or actual. For that reason the 7 liberal arts, being operative, cannot be considered speculative sciences. In the case of moral science, it is not an act of science but of virtue, so it is not an art, instead the virtue is the art.
Sciences are divided again by their ends in the speculative and operative division. However, when medicine is said to be divided, it is based on the proximity or remoteness to the operation of the things of medical science. Healing methods would be operative, and principles be speculative. Therefore calling a part of operative science speculative does not make it a speculative science.
Some sciences are part of other sciences not by being an actual part, but instead by subalternation. That is their principles are explained by the higher science. Medicine is not part of physics but it is subalternated to physics. Therefore, the whole of physics is still speculative, regardless if there are operative sciences subalternated to it.
The subjects of the sciences are part of being, but they do not necessarily discuss being as being as metaphysics do. Each particular science studies a part of being under a special intelligible aspect, this may be translated as particular aspect of sense, distinct from that in which being is contemplated in metaphysics. Therefore these sciences are not part of metaphysics.
All sciences contribute to the whole development of divine science. However, there is no vicious cycle, instead divine science has their principles proven by other self-evident principles. As such there is a linear progression of principles from the most self-evident principles to the lowest principles derived from many chains of demonstration. In any case, natural science is at first more accessible, but after going through it we arrive at divine science from which we obtain the principles necessary for natural science, that is the explanatory cause.
The next section concerns with the nature and excellence of metaphysics. First, when some things are ordered to a single thing. One of those things must be the regulator, while the others regulated. For example, the soul commands and the body obeys, or reason commands anger and desire. As for the sciences, all of the sciences and arts are ordained towards one thing, the perfection of man, which is his beatitude. Therefore one of those sciences must be a mistress of all the others which rightly lays claim to the title of wisdom. For it is the office of the wise to order others.
We can know the nature of this science by carefully considering how a person is qualified to rule, that is by the intellect. Therefore, the science that is to lead is the most intellectual science (highest degree intellectual). This science, however, is the one that treats of the most intelligible things. The most intelligible things mean the most comprehensible by the mind, but not the senses.
This we can regard first from the order of knowing, for those things which are the source of intellect's certitude seems to be the more intelligible ones. Thus, since it is from causes that the intellect achieves the certitude of science, the cognition of causes apparently is in the highest degree intellectual. Consequently that science which considers first causes evidently is regulative of the other sciences. This paragraph is indeed a bit difficult, but a key is that the most intelligible things is indeed causes. The more a thing is a cause, the more it is intelligible, this is how I understand it. Or, the causes of certitude, or source, are the more intelligible ones.
Second, the supremely intelligible objects can be considered from examining intellect's relation to sense knowledge. Sense knowledge is particular, while the intellect considers universals. Thus, the science which is maximally intellectual is the one which treats of principles supremely universal. Such principles however ought not to remain completely unspecified (unknown or as mere generality). Since without them full cognition of things proper to the particulars cannot be had. Now since every particular needs these principles, it follows that it cannot be treated in any one particular science but in a common science.
Third, the supremely intelligible objects can be considered from the standpoint of intellect's own cognition. Thus, since every thing (which is part of the supremely intelligible objects) has intellective power in consequence of its freedom from matter, those things must be pre-eminently intelligible which exist in complete separation from matter. The object and the intellect must be proportioned to each other, and must be of one genus, since the intellect and the intelligible are in act one (in actuality they are one). Now, those things are in the highest degree separated from matter which abstract not only from signate matter, but which abstract altogether from sensible matter not only according to reason but in actual existence as is God an the intelligences. Therefore, the science that considers these things is supremely intellectual and the chief or mistress of the others.
The foregoing threefold consideration (which may be summarized as first cause, universal principles, and immaterials) belongs by right to only one science. For the separated substances referred to above are the universal and the first causes of actual being. But it pertains to that one science to consider the proper causes of a genus and the genus itself. Therefore the science must study not only those substances but also common being, which is the genus of which these substances are the common and universal causes.
Although this science treats of the 3 things, God, intelligences, and common being, its only subject is common being. The subject of a science (referring to any science) is what the causes and passions of which we seek to know, but not the causes themselves. It is the knowledge of the causes of a genus which is the end of scientific thought. Although the subject is common being, it is predicated (based) of entities that are wholly separated from matter existentially as well as logically. Either because they are never in matter as God and intelligences are, or they can be without matter, as common being. This however would not be the case if they depended on matter in their being.
Therefore, in accordance with the aforesaid three things from which the perfection of this science is derived, it receives three names: "theology" inasmuch it considers God, metaphysics inasmuch it considers being and the things that follow upon it, and first philosophy inasmuch as it considers the first causes of things.
Second Response
This new response is meant to follow the new pattern of responding to materials. That is to "evaluate, apply, and explore". In this response I will mostly be exploring the topics and establishing my own thought system as inspired by the material and understanding of that material. It will mostly be a great rephrasing and restructuring of the main ideas of the material and thus adapting such and such into my own thought system.
It is an observation of this reality that we are required to study things in order to be able to perform well on those things. That things in general abide by a certain order, law, or principle which we must understand to be able to operate on those things well. The systematic effort of studying the things and their laws or principles is what we call the effort of science, or simply science.
Science is a study, a study being a noun which indicates an action, therefore science is an action. Science in general can be divided into 2 kinds of science, the speculative science and the operative science. The speculative science is aimed at knowledge alone, while operative science is aimed at an operation, in other words action, based on the knowledge of that particular science.
However, I comment that the speculative science never ends in itself, yet it contributes to operative science. At the same time, operative science does not end with action, but is meant to help lead us into the final end of mankind that is happiness, and that happiness consists in the intellectual vision of God, which we know as the beatific vision. This beatific vision is in other words, direct knowledge of God through the direct experience of God.
What that means is the final end of man is not action but knowledge, meaning the speculative sciences has a higher degree in moral value than the operative sciences. However, it is to be understood that the speculative sciences altogether do not reach the beatific vision, our intellect, even when outside the body, is incapable of reaching it by its own effort. Therefore God must move the intellect and reveal Himself to the intellect for us to possess that vision.
For no science can give us a true immediate knowledge of God, what is the purpose of any science at all? In this knowledge, most sciences are absolutely useless, but they are useful in relationship to reaching the beatific vision on the terms God set out for us. As such, the speculative sciences contribute to the operative sciences which is perfected in moral science. Moral science, which bases itself on theology, is what leads us to the beatific vision.
Now while the book has its own deeper meaning of science as a virtue and what not, I shall not explore them, but explore my own understanding of the sciences. That I have established science as a systematic effort of studying things. So then moral science is considered an operative science as it is the systematic effort of studying the conduct of mankind, or the requirements of attaining happiness, the supreme and ultimate end or purpose of mankind.
Among the speculative sciences there is one science which becomes the subject of the book which is metaphysics, also known as natural theology or first philosophy. Metaphysics has various meanings and essences which evolves throughout history. Aquinas himself said that metaphysics studies things of 3 particular attributes, first causes, universal principles, and immaterials. However, those 3 things of course point to one thing that is being as being.
Now the meaning of metaphysics has changed since the time of Aquinas, and I too am obliged to have a separate meaning, which I often describe as "study of the foundations of reality". By foundations of reality, we can agree that being and God is part of those foundations and are in fact those foundations. Being, that is the universal common denominator of all that is and is not, and God being the supreme actualizer of being.
However, the metaphysical theology must be distinguished from the revealed theology. Metaphysical theology is the study of God according to available metaphysical principles which in the end stem from physical principles. Revealed theology is the study of God according to what God Himself has revealed to us in the Church, that is the Catholic Church.
The question then arises, is any of this important, significant, or necessary? The answer is no. For God has ordained us to have different gifts and capacities, that not all of us must understand the sciences or philosophy for that manner in such exhaustive manner. The only science we must understand, not even in a philosophical manner, is the moral science which God has revealed to us in the revealed theology. The moral science, when practiced, shall lead us to the happiness we long for.
However, there are those such as I who long for a deeper understanding of these things, and that God has commanded me to understand these things, so I write of these to deepen my understanding of Him in this world, to facilitate the practice of the moral science and thus facilitate my achievement of happiness in the final direct immediate knowledge of God. This sums up my current response to the first chapter.
