It is the 2nd chapter of "An Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas", titled "The Subject of Metaphysics". This shall be my response to it in continuation of the former response to the 1st chapter. In the response of the 2nd chapter, I will attempt a kind of structure which is more integral and more structured than the first response. This structure will be divided into 2 parts, the first part being interpretation, and the second part being response. Interpretation is my understanding of the text, and response being my reaction or thoughts coming from myself directed towards the text.
Interpretation
The first paragraph is understood as it is. A science studies not only its subject but also its essential attributes. For example, the study of plants, botanics, studies not only the plant but also the essential attributes of a plant. This may mean that to study an object simply means to study its essence as a whole, but to study its essential attributes is to study its essence as a collection of parts which forms the essence. This is taken as the justification for the existence of a science which studies both being and being's essential attributes.
The second paragraph is understood as it is. Aristotle here uses the expression "being in so far as it is being" because the other sciences which studies particular beings do indeed consider being, for all the subjects of sciences are beings, yet they do not consider being as being, but as this sort of being, for example number, line, fire, or something of the kind.
The third paragraph is understood mostly as it is. Aristotle employs the phrase "and those things belonging to being in virtue of its own nature," not simply "those things which appertain to or exist in being" to point out that it is not the office of a science to consider those things that exist in its subject accidentally but only essentially. For example, geometry is not concerned with the material of a triangle, only that it has 3 angles. Therefore, to the science whose subject is being, it does not concern all that exists in it accidentally, otherwise it will study all of science. For although all accidents exist in some being, not all accidents exist in a being inasmuch as it is being. Thus essential accidents, it is called essential accidents as everything is considered accidental except that of being itself, of an inferior or a subordinate thing are accidental accidents in relation to the superior.
The fourth paragraph is understood as it is. Metaphysics is necessary as it is on the principles of being that all other knowledge is based upon.
The fifth paragraph is understood as it is. This science is not a particular science as according to Aristotle, no particular science considers universal being as such, but only some part of being cut off from its other parts, and of this separated part it examines the essential attribute. On the other hand, metaphysics considers universal being as being, therefore it is not to be identified with any particular science.
The sixth paragraph is understood as it is. No particular science treats of being as being, nor does it treat of any particular being as being. It is the office of the metaphysician, however, to consider any and every being, precisely as being.
The seventh paragraph is understood mostly. Because it pertains to metaphysics to consider being as being, so it is that no particular science is concerned with the problem of determining what being is. Rather, from the essence, that is being, such sciences proceed to other matters, using the presupposed essence, as if it were an already demonstrated principle, in order to prove other things.
The eighth paragraph is understood mostly. Just as no particular science determines the essence (being) of its subject, so none of them says regarding its subject, that it is or is not. For it belongs to metaphysics to study such things. But every particular science presupposes concerning its own subject both that it is and what it is. This shows that no particular science treats of being as being, nor of any being as being.
The ninth paragraph shall be examined in this section. That which first falls under the intellect's grasp is being (ens). In my previous understanding, this refers to the revelation of experience and existence, but it will be shown that existence is not entirely the same as being. However, the previous point of understanding may still be used to further understand this point. Thus the intellect necessarily attributes being to everything it understands. As it is seen as the ultimate or absolute category or set of all things. Being means that-which-is, or exists (esse habens).
The tenth paragraph shall be examined in this section. The verb is signifies composition in combination with something. This is because it does not signify the composition principally but secondarily. In an attempt of understanding, it is because is does not signify composition in a principal manner, but only a secondary manner. Is signifies primarily/principally that which the intellect understands as being absolutely actual, for in the absolute sense is means to be in act, and thus its mode of signification is that of a verb. Act here refers to both action and actuality, in combination. But, since the actuality which is principally signifies is universally the actuality of every form, whether substantially or accidentally, when we wish to signify that any form or any act whatever actually exists in a subject, we express the fact by this verb is.
The eleventh paragraph is understood as it is. The word being (ens) is imposed from the very act of existing, as Avicenna remarks, whereas the word thing (res) is imposed from the essence. Being properly signifies: something-existing-in-act. Being means that-which-has-existence-in-act. Now this is substance, which subsists.
The twelveth paragraph shall be examined in this section. The act of existing (esse) is that by which substance is given the name of being (ens). To examine this sentence, the act of existing, which is the actuality or action of existing, the state of existing, the action that is to exist, is that, referring back to esse, by which substance, as mentioned in the eleventh paragraph, is given the name of being (ens). By this examination, it can be concluded that esse is the reason ens has the name ens. This act, which is esse, is the actuality of every form or nature.
The thirteenth paragraph shall be examined in this section. Esse is among all principles the most perfect, which is evident from the fact that act is always more perfect than potentiality. Now any designated form is understood to exist actually only in virtue of the fact that it does exist actually. Thus humanity or fire can be considered as existing in the potentiality of matter, or as existing in active power of an agent, that is God, or also as existing in an intellect. But that which has esse is made actually existent. It is evident, therefore, that esse is the actuality of all acts, and for this reason it is the perfection of all perfections, thus esse is identical to God. Nor is it to be thought that something is added to esse which is more formal than esse itself, thus determining it as an act determines a potentiality. This may be understood as meaning that acts are what determines the fate of the potentiality. For the esse is essentially other than that to which it is added as a certain determining principle.
The fourteenth paragraph shall be examined in this section. Nothing can be added to esse that is extraneous to it, since nothing is extraneous to it except nothing (non-ens). Esse then is not determined by another as a potentiality is determined by an act, but esse is determined as an act by a potentiality, that is the essence. And in this way is one esse distinguished from another esse, namely, according as it is the esse of this nature, or essence, or of that. What this means is that an esse is distinguished from another esse by the nature that it is.
The fifteenth paragraph is understood as it is. Esse is what is innermost in each and every thing and what is deepest in them all, for it is formal in respect of all that is in a thing.
The sixteenth paragraph shall be examined in this section. Esse itself is act in relation to both composite and simple natures. Composite natures are not made specifically what they are by this act, but rather by their essence, for specification concerns a thing's essence, whereas esse evidently pertains to the question whether a thing is. Nor are angelic substances so specified. Rather, their differentiation into species is based on those simple subsisting forms which they themselves are, and which differ specifically according to their own grade of perfection.
The seventeenth paragraph shall be examined in this section. Esse is superior to life and to all other subsequent perfections. This again points to the definition of God as purely esse. Yet if esse is considered as it is participated in any thing whatever which has imperfect being, then clearly esse in union with the superadded perfection is higher. Accordingly Dionysius says that living things are better than merely existing things, and intelligent things than merely living things. What this means is that in the pure sense, esse is absolute perfection, but in terms of creatures, esse is higher when in union with the superadded perfection.
The eighteenth paragraph shall be examined in this section. Esse as such is nobler than everything that follows upon it. Thus considered absolutely and in itself, as God, this act is nobler than the act of understanding. Indeed that which excels in being (in esse), or God, is purely and simply nobler than any thing which excels in any perfection consequent upon being.
The nineteenth paragraph shall be examined in this section. Being, understood as signifying the entity of a thing (entitas rei) is divided into 10 categories, and thus taken, being (ens) is convertible with thing (res).
The twentieth paragraph shall be examined in this section. The name essence is taken from being expressed in the first mode, not from being expressed in the second mode. For as is clear in the case of privations, in the latter mode we call some things beings which do not have an essence. Because being said in the first mode is divided into the 10 categories, essence must signify something common to all natures, through which diverse beings are placed in diverse genera and species. For instance, humanity is the essence of man.
The twentyfirst paragraph shall be examined in this section. Moreover, since that by which a thing is constituted in its proper genus and species is what is signified by the definition indicating what the thing is, philosophers have taken the name quiddity for the name essence. Aristotle calls this the quod quid erat esse, that by which a thing is a what. It is also called form inasmuch as form signifies the complete essential determination of each thing. Also it is called nature according as nature is said to be that which can be grasped by the intellect in any way: for a thing is intelligible only by its definition and essence. But nature also seems to signify the essence of the thing as ordered to its proper operation, for nothing is without its proper operation. The name quiddity, on the other hand, is derived from that which is signified by the definition, whereas essence means that through which and in which a thing has its act of existing.
Response
The response does not concern itself with every paragraph, rather with the entirety of the idea of the chapter. It does have its end to further and deepen understanding on the ideas contained within this chapter. There are 3 main topics to be explored, being as being, the meaning of being in relation to the act of existing, and the meaning of being in relation to essence.
The first heading, being as being, is more about the nature of metaphysics in general than being itself. This can continue straight from the response to the first chapter. Metaphysics concerns itself with being as being, as opposed to the particular sciences which concerns itself with being as whatever that science studies. For example, biology studies being as living things, physics studies being as moving things, chemistry studies being as the elements, and so on. However, metaphysics studies being as precisely being itself.
The second heading, the meaning of being in relation to the act of existing, is much more complicated. For that reason this response will critique, elaborate, and explore deeper on what has been laid out in the second heading. Being is the ultimate category, category as in a group of related things, of all things. If we are to ask what is the common part of all things, it would be being. As Aquinas implies throughout his writing, being is truly final and supreme, there is nothing outside of being. However, what being is precisely cannot be understood fully in one or two sentences.
In Aquinas' writing, being is considered the first of the intellect, as opposed to experience. It seems the notion of experience is taken for granted, or that this section is not where the discussion of experience is placed. However, what it means to be the first under intellect's grasp is not perfectly understood by me. I simply interpret that it means what the intellect first obtains, but that has to be experience, and not being. However, being and experience comes together at the same time, though it is more accurate that experience reveals being in the same time, thus owing to experience's prior order of revelation to us.
Now it is argued that experience itself does not exist on its own, which I disagree, and so being is what the intellect attributes to everything it understands. So because being is among the first-revealed-thing in the intellect, then supposedly all things encountered by our intellect is a being. Now, Aquinas' writing probably holds a causal model of being and experience, between being and phenomenon. Such that there is truly being outside of experience, yet even the union model holds still, as it does not elevate experience over being rather in equality to being or existence. As such it is held true that being means that-which-is, or exists. (esse habens, literally meaning having the act of existing).
Now because apparently being is a greater set than the set of existence, this allows us to ask, what does it mean for something to exist? We shall follow Aquinas and see where it leads us. In the context of Aquinas, to exist means to be in act. Or as written, being is something-existing-in-act or that-which-has-existence-in-act. What does it mean to be in act or actuality? As the only standard is experience, then I shall involve it. It means to be experienced fully, that is the meaning of existing in actuality, as opposed to be experienced partially that is potentiality.
Yet this act is relative to each subject alone. The existential nature of an object cannot be objective, as we must refer back to God. God has all knowledge, it means His knowledge includes everything. As His knowledge includes all, it means it includes all experiences in so far knowledge is at heart experience, recollective or recreational experience. For the knowledge of the wavelength and frequency of light differs from the knowledge of the colors which they are in experience. Therefore, from the point of God, everything exists in full act, there is no potentiality in God.
Then all forms of change, and finite or imperfect being is a matter of the creature which does not possess God's infinite knowledge and being, for God there can be no change yet He alone is the source of all change. Therefore, the actuality of our experiences and thus the beings we encounter is determined by us. It is by our finite experience that there are finite beings. Without the creation of finite experience, there can be no finite beings. However, due to the fact of our finite nature, then the truth of the finite beings is guaranteed and protected.
With that we can still speak of beings in the finite sense, after all that is what we are surrounded with. Only in a mediate sense do we encounter the infinite being that is God, behind the shadows of finite reality. The act of existing, esse, is among all principles, or foundations of beings, is the most perfect, evident from the fact that act is always more perfect than potentiality. Perfection here may not completely refer to goodness in a moral sense, but completion in a metaphysical sense.
Esse in the strictest sense refers to God, where essence and esse is united totally without any metaphysical distinction. This is why Aquinas describes esse as the actuality of all actualities, and the perfection of all perfections, which is attributable only to God. However, esse is understood also as what it literally means, the act of existing. The act of existing then is participated by finite beings though in an imperfect manner.
Essence is then the identity of a thing, it is simply what a thing is. Though Aquinas may have some differences on the idea of an essence, I hold for now that all things which are being, have an essence which is metaphysically separate from their esse. Without esse, the essence is simply a possibility, a potentiality, but with esse, the essence becomes actually there. Thus sums up my response to the 2nd chapter.
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